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Abstract
A topic of current research in discussion about the Brazilian economy is the exemption from payroll taxes, which aims to
stimulate competitiveness of the firms, boosting economic growth. This topic was introduced in Brazil by new laws that proposed
replacing the payroll tax with a new tax on revenues. The payroll tax rate of 20% was replaced by a tax rate of 1% or 2% on
revenue. This change has been applied primarily in labor-intensive economic sectors. In this paper, a neoclassical model was used
to evaluate some sectoral impacts of these tax changes. The results show positive effects of this reform, among them, the increase
in aggregate consumption and capital stock. Employment also grows in the labor-intensive sector. However, under a government
revenue neutral scenario, these effects are almost completely lost, which shows some evidence about the low efficiency of these
reforms.
© 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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Resumo
Um tema em recente no âmbito da economia brasileira é a desonerac¸ão da folha de pagamentos, a qual objetiva estimular a
competitividade das firmas, em direc¸ão ao crescimento econômico. Este tópico foi introduzido no Brasil por meio de medidas
provisórias as quais propunham substituir a alíquota previdenciária patronal incidente sobre a folha de pagamentos por uma nova
alíquota incidente sobre o faturamento. A alíquota patronal de 20% foi substituída por uma alíquota de 1% ou 2% sobre o faturamento.
Esta mudanc¸a sendo feita primeiramente em setores econômicos intensivos em mão de obra. Neste artigo, um modelo neoclássico
foi utilizado para avaliar alguns impactos setoriais advindos dessas mudanc¸as. Os resultados evidenciam efeitos positivos dessa
reforma, entre eles, crescimento do consumo agregado, e estoque de capital. O emprego também cresce no setor intensivo em∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +55 08134425817.
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rabalho. Entretanto, sob um cenário neutro de arrecadac¸ão, esses efeitos são praticamente nulos, o que mostra alguma evidência
cerca da baixa eficiência dessas reformas.
 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
eserved.
alavras chave: Modelos neoclássicos; Reformas tributárias; Desonerac¸ão da folha de pagamentos
.  Introduction
In August 2011 the Brazilian government proposed a set of programs and economic actions to seek productivity
rowth and competitiveness of the economy.1 One of the first measures was a tax modification that replaced the payroll
ax of labor-intensive firms by a tax on their revenues. The payroll tax rate of 20% was replaced by a tax rate of 1% or
% of revenues of the benefited sectors. By the beginning of 2014, this measure has already included 56 sectors of the
razilian economy 2.
The rate of 1% applies on revenues of industrial sectors, whereas for services3 the tax rate is 2%. This change was
ot revenue neutral. In fact, the Secretariat of Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) estimates the revenue loss at 0.02% of
DP.
In this paper we carried out some simulations to study the macroeconomic effects of this tax reform. We built a
eoclassical model with a representative household, two intermediate firms – one labor-intensive and other capital-
ntensive – and a unique final good firm. Four scenarios were considered in the analysis: the first reform (referred to
eform 1) replaces the payroll tax rate by a tax rate of 1% on revenue of the labor-intensive firm; the second reform
reform 2) considers a tax rate of 2% on revenue of the labor-intensive firms; the third simulation (reform  3) replaces
he payroll tax rate by a tax (on revenue) which is government revenue neutral, and finally, the fourth tax change
reform 4) uses a payroll tax rate which implies the same level of government revenues losses of the first reform in
he long term. Our model was based in Paes (2011, 2012).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the applied literature, while in Section 3, we
escribe the macroeconomic model used in this study. Section 4 contains the description of the model calibration and
n Section 5, we discuss the results. Finally, in Section 6 we present the conclusions of this research.
.  A  review  of  literature
There are many works that analyze the economic effects associated with tax changes. Studies based on dynamic
eneral equilibrium models have been quite prevalent. As an initial reference, Fullerton (1982) used a neoclassical
odel to study the impacts of several tax reforms on the U.S. economy. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) constructed an
verlapping generation (OLG) model to analyze how changes in fiscal policies affect the American economy. In this
aper, the authors evaluated some economic impacts of changes in the tax rates on income, wages, and consumption.
Lucas (1990) studied the impacts of shifting capital income taxation to labor income taxation. Following a neoclas-
ical perspective, Cooley and Hansen (1992) analyzed the economic effects of some tax changes that combine different
ates for capital and labor income taxes. The results suggest that the welfare costs are strictly lower in economies that
eplace taxation on capital by other less distortive taxes such as consumption taxes.Prescott (2002) looks at the tax burden and the trade-off between consumption and leisure. In his study, he compares
he productivity per worker in the USA and France, concluding that the differences between consumption taxes and
abor taxes have a big impact on productivity per worker in these countries.
1 MIDC(Ministério do Desenvolvimento and Indústria e Comércio Exterior, 2011).
2 For example, auto parts, poultry, machinery and equipment, toys, call center, ceramics, retail trade, manufacturing, construction, footwear,
esign house, railway equipment, medical and dental equipment, aircraft, ships, buses, pharmacies and medicines, stoves, hotels, optical instruments,
lectrical equipment, furniture, pulp and paper, stones and ornamental rocks, plastic, tires, textiles, and information technology.
3 Computer services, call center, design houses, hotels, public road transport, construction of infrastructure, maintenance of machinery and
quipment, support services to the defense industry, engineering and architecture, technical support in computer.
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Using data of the World War II, McGrattan (McGrattan and Ohanian, 2008) examined the predictive power of
neoclassical models to study the economic effects of fiscal shocks. Their model was able to estimate real GDP,
investment, consumption, labor supply, capital and labor income, close to the empirical values of the World War II
period.
A pioneering study applied to the Brazilian economy was proposed by Araújo and Ferreira (1999). They analyzed
the economic effects of the fiscal policy changes that were discussed in Brazil between 1995 and 1997. They focused
on a tax change that reduced taxes on labor and capital, while increasing the taxation on consumption. The results
show an increase of product, employment, capital stock and household welfare.
Paes and Bugarin (2006) analyzed the economic effects of two tax reforms on the Brazilian economy. In the first
tax change, the authors proposed the end of the cumulativity of PIS/COFINS4 and the transfer of half of the employer
payroll tax to a new contribution on value added. In the second tax change, the social contribution on added value
(CSVA) was suggested, replacing the ICMS,5 as well as a new excise tax replacing the IPI6. In the long term, the
reforms led to the increase of output, consumption, employment, capital stock, and welfare, but when the transition
periods were considered, these gains were reduced significantly.
Following a neoclassical approach, Cavalcanti (2008) analyzed the allocative and welfare impacts of a tax change
that replaces payroll taxes by a tax on the firms’ revenues. The results implied negative effects on welfare and capital
stock, with an increase of employment in the long-term. Bitencourt and Teixeira (2008) proposed a multi sectoral
model to simulate competitiveness impacts arising from payroll and labor taxes cuts. The results show a small decline
on wages, increase in capital stock, investments and exports, favoring the domestic market.
Paes (2011) constructed a neoclassical model with 55 firms to simulate the economic effects of substituting all
consumption taxes in Brazil by a value-added tax, with only one exemption to essential goods. The results indicated a
slight expansion in the output, consumption, employment and investment, with small loss in government revenue and
also with welfare’s growth. In addition, industrial sectors have benefited in expense of the services sector. The author
also estimated the effects of replacing the payroll tax only to industrial sector by an 20% elevation in COFINS for all
sectors (Paes, 2012). The results lead to a massive growth in employment and industrial products, with a small decline
in agriculture and services.
This paper provides a new research approach for the Brazilian economic literature on the impacts of tax changes in
payroll taxes by introducing two types of firms: labor-intensive and capital-intensive. Only the first has its payroll tax
replaced by a revenue tax, while the second has not tax changes. In this sense, we have proposed a modified version
of the model used by Paes (2011, 2012).
3.  The  macroeconomic  model
The economy is based on a deterministic neoclassical model with capital accumulation and discrete time. This
artificial economy is closed, with constant-scale returns and no population growth. The households are aggregated
by a representative agent with utility function depending on their consumption and leisure levels. The represen-
tative household offers labor and rents capital to the intermediate firms. The levels of consumption and leisure
are chosen in order to maximize the discounted utility restricted by the budget constraint of the representative
household.
In the intermediate sector there are two competitive firms, one labor-intensive, and another capital-intensive. The
final good of the economy is produced by a convex combination of the intermediate goods. The government revenue
come from taxes on consumption, capital income, labor income, and on revenues and payroll of the intermediate firms.
The taxes on consumption, capital and labor are paid by the representative household, and the taxes on revenues and
payroll are paid by the intermediate firms.
4 The PIS is a consumption tax used in order to finance the payment of unemployment insurance and to subsidize the workers who earn up to two
minimum wages. COFINS is also a consumption tax to finance social security.
5 In Brazil, the ICMS is the main tax on consumption of goods and services.
6 The IPI is an excise tax on consumption of manufactured products.
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.1.  Representative  household
The representative household has an infinite life and maximizes its discounted fluxes of logarithmic utilities subject
o budget constraint. The problem of the representative household is described below
max
{ct ,lt ,ht ,kt}
∑
t≥0
βt [log(ct) +  α  log(lt)],
subject to restrictions
Pt[(1 +  τct)ct +  kt+1 −  (1 −  δ)kt] =  (1 −  τht)wtht +  (1 −  τkt)rtkt +  PtTt
(1)
ht +  lt =  1,  (2)
here β  is the intertemporal discount factor and α  is the relative weight of leisure in the utility function; ct, ht, lt e
t are the consumption, labor hours, leisure hours, and capital stock at period-t, respectively; rt and wt are the capital
ent price and the wage paid by intermediate firms at period-t, respectively; Pt is the price of the final good at period-
; Tt is a lump-sum transfer made by the government to the representative household at period-t. The tax rates on
onsumption, labor income and capital returns are represented by τct, τht, τkt, respectively. In order to avoid labor and
apital allocations in only one sector we have assumed that both firms (labor-intensive and capital-intensive) pay the
ame rentals rt and wages wt .
The Lagrangian of the maximization problem above is (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004)
L  =  βt [log(ct) +  α  log(1 −  ht)]+  βt+1 [log(ct+1)α  log(1 −  ht+1)]+  (βtλt)
× [Pt (1 +  τct) ct +  kt+1 −  (1 −  δ) kt −  (1 −  τht) wt ht −  (1 −  τkt) rt kt −  Pt Tt]
+ βt+1 λt+1
[
Pt+1 (1 +  τct+1) ct+1 +  kt+2 −  (1 −  δ) kt+1
]−  (βt+1 λt+1)
× [(1 −  τht+1) wt+1 ht+1 +  (1 −  τkt) rt+1 kt+1 +  Pt+1 Tt+1] .  (3)
Considering the Lagrange multiplier, βt λt, at time-t, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂ct
=  0 ⇔  βt 1
ct
+  βt λt Pt (1 +  τct) =  0 ⇔  λt =  − 1
Pt (1 +  τct) ct ,  (4)
∂L
∂ht
=  0 ⇔  − α
1 −  ht −  λt (1 −  τht) wt =  0,  (5)
∂L
∂kt+1
=  0 ⇔  βt λt −  βt+1 λt+1 (1 −  δ) −  βt+1 λt+1 (1 −  τkt+1) rt+1 =  0.  (6)
After some algebraic manipulation which includes to substitute λt and λt+1 obtained by (4) into Eqs. (5) and (6),
e obtain the following relationships
ht =  1 − α  Pt (1 +  τct) ct(1 −  τht) wt , (7)
ct+1 =  β
(
1 +  τct
1 +  τc t+1
)
[(1 −  τk t+1) rt+1 +  (1 −  δ)] ct.  (8)
Eq. (7) describes the trade-off between consumption and labor, while Eq. (8) is the Euler’s equation (see, e.g., Barro
nd Sala-I-Martin, 1995), which describes the trade-off between present and future consumption..2.  Intermediate  ﬁrms
We suppose that in the production of intermediate goods there are two competitive firms, one labor-intensive
sector I), and another capital-intensive (sector ˜I). The intermediate firms rent capital and labor from households to
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produce goods and services for the economy. The production functions of the intermediate firms follow a Cobb–Douglas
structure as described below:
Yst =  As ˆkθsst ˆh1−θsst ,  (9)
where Yst, ˆkst , ˆhst are, respectively, the product, capital and labor factors of the sector s ∈  {I, ˜I} at period-t; θs is the
share of capital income in the product of the sector s. The constant As denotes the technology of this sector.
The problem of an intermediary firm s  is given by the choice of the demands for labor hours and capital stock in
order to maximize its profit. In general, at time-t, the aggregate profit of the sector s is given by
πst =  (1 −  τsft) pst Yst −  (1 +  τspt) wst ˆhst −  rst ˆkst,  (10)
where πst indicates the profit of the firm s  ∈  {I, ˜I} at time-t; ˆhst and ˆkst are the labor and capital demands of the firm s at
time-t; τsft e τspt are the tax rates on revenue and payroll paid by the firm s  at period-t; the quantities rst and wst denote,
respectively, the capital rental price and the wage paid by the firm s  at period-t; pst is the price of the intermediate good
produced by sector s.
In the model, we have considered the tax rates on revenues for the first steady state of the economy (τsf 0,  s  ∈  {I, ˜I},
respectively) equal to zero. Furthermore, at initial steady state, we made τIp0 =  τ ˜Ip0 =  τp, with τp being calibrated using
data from Brazilian national accounts from 2009. In later periods, for the scenarios 1, 2 and 3, the payroll tax rates
of the labor-intensive sector, τIpt , are equal to zero and its tax rates on revenues are chosen according each analyzed
reform, namely, τIft =  1%,  2% or 4.7% for the reforms 1, 2 and 3, respectively. For the simulation 4, the payroll tax
rate of the labor-intensive sector is reduced in order to maintain the same magnitude of government revenues losses of
the first reform.
At period-t, the ﬁrst  order  conditions  of the optimization problems of intermediate firms are obtained equalling to
zero the marginal profits vector (i.e.,
(
∂πst
∂ˆkst
, ∂πst
∂ ˆhst
)
= (0,  0)), for which the solutions are
rst =  pst (1 −  τsft) θs As ˆkθs−1st ˆh1−θsst ,  (11)
wst =
pst (1 −  τsft) (1 −  θs) As ˆkθsst ˆh−θsst
(1 +  τspt)
. (12)
3.3.  The  ﬁnal  good  ﬁrm
Here, we suppose that the final good firm is competitive and its product can be computed by combining intermediate
goods using a constant  elasticity  of  substitution  (CES) production function as
Yt =
[
Y
1/λ
It +  Y1/λ˜It
]λ
,  (13)
where 1< λ  < ∞  is the substitution elasticity parameter between intermediate inputs. The functional form described
above is widely used in macroeconomic literature. Furthermore, it has a Gorman’s type form, which ensures the
existence of the steady state conditions (see, e.g, Acemoglu, 2009). Denoting by σ  the substitution elasticity between
intermediate goods, it follows that σ  = λ
λ−1 . Then, when λ  →  1+ the goods tend to be perfectly substitutes and when
λ→ ∞, the goods tend to be perfectly complementary.
The maximization of the profit,
t =  Pt Yt −  pIt YIt −  p˜It Y˜It, (14)
results in the following ﬁrst  order  conditions:(
pIt
) λ
1−λ
= YIt ,  (15)Pt Yt(
p
˜It
Pt
) λ
1−λ
= Y˜It
Yt
. (16)
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Eq. (14), (15), and (16) imply the following relationship between the prices of intermediate and final goods:
Pt =
[
p
1/(1−λ)
It +  p1/(1−λ)˜It
]1−λ
. (17)
In order to simplify the characterization of the relative prices we have chosen Pt = 1 for all period-t.
.4.  Government
The government is passive, i.e., given the choices made by the other agents, it only makes sure that its budget is
alanced. In this sense, the government uses the tax revenues to finance public spending and transfers to households.
he government restriction at period-t  is
G  +  Tt =  τct ct +  τkt rt kt +  τht wt ht +  τIpt wIt ˆhIt +  τ ˜Ipt w˜It ˆh˜It +  τIft pIt YIt +  τ ˜Ift p˜It Y˜It, (18)
here G is the government spending (constant for all t = 1, .  .  ., T) and Tt is the government transfers to the representative
ousehold at period-t.
.5.  Steady  state
In the two steady states (before and after each reform, respectively), the level of variables k, Y  and c  (capital, GDP
nd consumption) grow at a zero rate. For the first steady state of the economy, τIp =  τ ˜Ip =  τp and τIf =  τ ˜If =  0. At
he second stationary equilibrium, on the reforms 1, 2 and 3, τIp =  0,  τ ˜Ip =  τp, τ ˜If =  0, and the choice of τIf is made
n accordance with the analyzed scenario (τIf =  1%,  2% or 4.7% – reforms 1, 2 and 3, respectively). For the fourth
eform, τIp =  1.3%,  τ ˜Ip =  τp, τ ˜If =  0, and τIf =  0. In this section, we described the equations at the first steady state
f the economy.
Assuming I* being the investment at the steady state, it follows that
I∗ =  kt∗+1 −  (1 −  δ) kt∗ ,  (19)
kt∗+1 =  kt∗ , (20)
here t* is the first steady state period of the economy. Eqs. (19) and (20) imply that δ  = I∗
kt∗
.
Labor hours of the representative household is
ht∗ =  1 − α(1 +  τct
∗ ) ct∗
(1 −  τht∗ ) wt∗
.  (21)
When ct∗+1 =  ct∗ , Eq. (8) simplifies to
β [(1 −  τk) rt∗ +  (1 −  δ)] =  1.  (22)
Prices of the intermediate goods following the equations
V t
∗
AI
=  pIt∗
[
YIt∗
Yt∗
]
,  (23)
V t
∗
A
˜I
=  p
˜It∗
[
Y
˜It∗
Yt∗
]
,  (24)
here V t∗AI and V
t∗
A
˜I
are the shares of the products of labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors in the total output of
he economy at period-t*, respectively.
Capital stocks of the intermediate firms (ˆkIt∗ and ˆk˜It∗ ) can be computed through the share of the capital income onDP as
rIt∗
[
ˆkIt∗
Yt∗
]
+  r
˜It∗
[
ˆk
˜It∗
Y∗t
]
=  pIt∗ θI
[
YIt∗
Y∗t
]
+ p
˜It∗ θ˜I
[
Y
˜It∗
Y∗t
]
,  (25)
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where kt = ˆkIt + ˆk˜It for all t. Moreover, in order to avoid any capital stock (ˆkI or ˆk˜I ) collapses to zero, we assume that
rIt =  r˜It =  rt , for all t.
The computation of wages assumes that both firms pay the same amount (wIt =  w˜It =  wt), for all t. This assumption
was made to avoid households to work only for the sector that pays the highest wage. The expressions involving wages
are [
wIt∗
Yt∗
]
ˆhIt∗ =
pIt∗ (1 −  θI )
(1 +  τp)
[
YIt∗
Yt∗
]
,  (26)
[
w
˜It∗
Yt∗
]
ˆh
˜It∗ =
p
˜It∗ (1 −  θ˜I )
(1 +  τp)
[
Y
˜It∗
Yt∗
]
, (27)
where, ht = ˆhIt + ˆh˜It , for all t. Thus,
(1 +  τp)
[
wt∗
Yt∗
]
ht∗ =  (1 −  θI ) V t∗AI +  (1 −  θ˜I ) V t
∗
A
˜I
. (28)
For the calculation of government transfers we used Eq. (18) with τIpt∗ =  τ ˜Ipt∗ =  τp and τIft∗ =  τ
˜I
ft∗ =  0. Finally,
the aggregate constraint is given by
ct∗ +  δ  kt∗ +  Gt∗ =  Yt∗ .  (29)
3.6.  Transitional  dynamic
The equilibrium of the dynamic system is given by the solution of the non-linear system involving Eqs. (1), (7), (8),
by consider rIt =  r˜It and wIt =  w˜It using the expressions in (11) and (12), by Eqs. (15), (16), (18), by the aggregate
equations kt = ˆkIt + ˆk˜It and ht = ˆhIt + ˆh˜It for all t, and considering an initial capital stock (k0 =  kt∗ ) with a transition
period of T  = 200.
In the equilibrium solution, the trajectories of the variables ct, ht, ˆhIt, ˆh˜It,  kt , ˆkIt, ˆk˜It,  pIt, p˜It , and Tt, t = 1, .  .  .,
T, are obtained using the non-linear optimization algorithm proposed by Broyden (1965) which is a quasi-Newton
algorithm that aimed at obtaining the solutions by solving a single non-linear system including all equations of the
transition period for each analysed tax reform.
4.  Calibration
The data used in the calibration step were extracted from IBGE’s (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)
for the years 2008 and 2009. For simplicity, we considered the price of the final product as a numeraire. We classified
as labor-intensive firms the economic sectors where the labor compensation is larger than the gross operating surplus.
The opposite happens for firms classified as capital-intensive. The calibration of the model is described in the following
subsections.4.1.  Consumption,  government  expenditure  and  investment
According to data from IBGE, (consumption)/GDP, (investment)/GDP, and (government spending)/GDP ratios
were calibrated as 61.02%, 17.81%, and 21.17% respectively. In our analysis, we fix the labor hours at h  = 0.25 which
corresponds to approximately 44 h of work per week ((44/168) = 0.26). The return of capital rt∗ was considered equal
to the real Brazilian interest rate, which was defined by the difference between the Brazilian nominal interest rate
(the SELIC interest rate) and the extended national consumer price index (IPCA). The adjusted real interest rate was
rt∗ =  2.45% per annum at the end of 2009.
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Table 1
Tax revenue distribution according to IBGE’s National Accounts (2009).
Generator fact Percentage of GDP
Tax revenues on labor income 9.61
Tax revenues on payroll 3.84
Tax revenues on consumption 14.11
Tax revenues on capital 6.08
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kTax burden 33.64
.2.  Capital  participations  in  sector  incomes
The shares of capital income in each sector (labor-intensive and capital-intensive), denoted by θI and θ˜I , were
btained by dividing its gross operating surplus by product of the corresponding sector. Using IBGE’s data, we found
I = 0.2930 and θ˜I =  0.7280, respectively.
.3.  Taxation
The tax system was divided in five blocks: taxes on labor income, taxes on capital income, taxes on consumption,
axes on revenues, and payroll taxes. In the model, taxes on capital, labor, and consumption are paid by the representative
ousehold and the intermediate firms bear the costs of taxation on payroll and revenues.
In the first steady state, both sectors (I and ˜I) are subject to the same payroll taxation and do not pay taxes on
evenues. Thus, in the initial steady state, there is no difference in taxation between them. From the transition to the
ew steady state, the labor-intensive firm replaces his payroll tax rate τIp by a tax rate of 1%, 2% or 4.7% on revenues
reforms 1, 2, and 3, respectively). During this period, the capital-intensive firm (sector ˜I) remains under the same tax
egime used in the first steady state. The distribution of tax revenues was calibrated from IBGE’s data and is available
n Table 1.
The tax rates were calculated based on Table 1. Denoting the (labor tax revenue)/GDP ratio by ‘arrtrab’ the labor
ax rate is calculated by
τh = arrtrab
wt∗ ht∗
=  17.82%.  (30)
The payroll tax rate is calculated by dividing the share of the payroll tax on GDP (arrpatr) by the total labor income
hare in the product of the economy:
τp = arrpatr
wt∗ ht∗
=  7.12%.  (31)
The tax rate on capital income is obtained by dividing the revenue from the tax on capital income (arrcap) by the
hare of capital income in the output of the economy:
τk = arrcap
rt∗ kt∗
=  14.41%.  (32)
.4.  Intermediate  goods  prices
The prices of the intermediate goods were obtained through Eqs. (23) and (24) considering the value of the constant
 (elasticity  substitution  constant) according to the estimate of Christiano et al. (2005) (λ  = 1.85). Thus, Eqs. (15), (16),
23), and (24) imply pIt∗ =  1.3496 and p˜It∗ =  2.8045..5.  Capital  stock,  wages,  and  labor  hours
The aggregate capital stock was computed by Eqs. (11), (23), (24), and (25), and considering rIt∗ =  r˜It∗ =  rt∗ , and
t∗ = ˆkIt∗ + ˆk˜It∗ . Thus, kt∗ =  14.8181, ˆkIt∗ =  7.2253 and ˆk˜It∗ =  7.5928.
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Table 2
Long-term macroeconomic results.
Tax rates discrimination Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 4
Tax rate on consumption 14.41% 14.41% 14.41% 14.41%
Tax rate on labor 17.82% 17.82% 17.82% 17.82%
Payroll tax rate 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.300%
Tax rate on capital 23.13% 23.13% 23.13% 23.13%
Tax rate on the labor-intensive revenue 1.00% 2.00% 4.70% 0.00%
Tax rate on the capital-intensive revenue 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Percentage changes in macroeconomic variables
Aggregate capital stock 1.5148% 0.3004% −2.9270% 2.2196%
Labor-intensive capital stock 2.1084% 0.0715% −5.3194% 3.3737%
Capital-intensive capital stock 0.9500% 0.5182% −0.6505% 1.1214%
GDP 2.5039% 1.6425% −0.6793% 2.7262%
Labor-intensive product 3.7115% 2.5216% −0.6790% 3.9684%
Capital-intensive product −0.3252% −0.4222% −0.6801% −0.1834%
Consumption 3.6622% 2.6043% −0.2604% 3.8211%
Investment 1.5148% 0.3004% −2.9270% 2.2196%
Government spending 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
Government revenue −3.4841% −2.6027% −0.4038% −3.4891%
Aggregate labor hours 3.2576% 2.6518% 1.0207% 3.1229%
Labor hours of the labor-intensive sector 4.3833% 3.5846% 1.3103% 4.2159%
Labor hours of the capital-intensive sector −3.6597% −2.8963% −0.7592% −3.5936%
Welfare 1.0187% 0.6128% −0.5316% 1.1595%
Present welfare 0.5841% 0.5164% 0.2899% 0.5328%
The wage was calculated by Eqs. (26), (27), and (28), considering wIt∗ =  w˜It∗ =  wt∗ . This assumption was made
to avoid labor allocations only in the sector which pays the highest wage. Since only the representative household
supplies labor for both sectors, there is no reason to have different wages between them. Thus, wt∗ =  2.1572. The
labor hours were calibrated from Eqs. (26) and (27), which result in ˆhIt∗ = 0.2150 and ˆh˜It∗ =  0.0350.
4.6.  Weight  of  leisure  in  the  utility  function,  intertemporal  discount  rate,  depreciation,  and  sectoral  products
The weight of leisure in the utility function of the representative household was obtained by equation (7), which
provides α  = 1.7696. To calibrate the depreciation δ, given the ratios (investment)/GDP, denoted by I*, and (capital)/GDP,
represented by kt∗ , Eqs. (19) and (20) provide δ = 0.0369.
The intertemporal discount rate was calculated by Eqs. (22) that implies β  = 0.9634. Using Eqs. (15) and (16), the
outputs of the intermediate firms are YIt∗ =  0.5207 and Y˜It∗ =  0.1060, respectively.
4.7.  Government  transfers
We use equation (18) which implies G  = 21.17%.
5.  Simulation  results
The reforms are characterized by the replacement of payroll tax rate of the labor-intensive sector by a tax on its
revenue. The first simulation (reform 1) establishes a tax rate of 1% on its revenue, the second simulation (reform 2)
proposes a tax rate of 2% on its revenue. The third reform is neutral with respect to government revenue in the first
steady state, with a tax rate τIft, t =  1,  .  . ., T, of 4.7%, i.e., τp0w0hI0 =  (4.7%) pI0YI0. In the final simulation, the tax
change was made only in the payroll tax of the labor-intensive sector. In this sense, we chose a payroll tax rate that
leads to the same fall in government revenue of reform 1, which is less than the level calibrated in Section 4. In all
analysis, we fixed the government spending at the level calibrated in Section 4, so that, any fall in government revenues
is fully financed with government transfers.
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he x-axes, the time in years after reforms.
The long-term results are showed in Table 2. The values in Table 2 are presented in percentage changes relatively
o the first steady state. For each reform, the table shows the new taxes rates (upper lines), the macroeconomic
ariables changes (center lines) and the welfare results (bottom lines). The welfare variations were computed using
he consumption compensating variation as made in Araújo and Ferreira (1999).
In order to computing the welfare variation in present value (at initial period) we used the following methodology:
1) first, we computed the values {ctdt}, t  = 1, . . ., T, and {Yt}, t  = 1, .  .  ., T, where dt is the consumption compensating
ariation at period t, so that, each {ctdt}, t  = 1, . .  ., T, accounts the consumption variation to keep the representative
ousehold with the same utility level of the first period; (2) then, we obtained the present values of the flows {ct dt}t=1,...,T
nd {Yt}t=1,...,T (denoted by VPcd  and VPY, respectively), according to the expressions
VPcd  =
T∑
t=1
ct dt∏t
j=1 (1 +  rj)
, (33)
VPY =
T∑
t=1
Yt∏t
j=1 (1 +  rj)
, (34)
here rt is the real interest rate at period-t. Thus, the present value of the welfare variation can be expressed in terms
f the GDP by
VPcd
VPwc  =
VPY
.  (35)
Fig. 1 shows the paths of the aggregate variables (consumption, investment, capital stock, labor-hours, and GDP)
nd also the welfare variation for each reform. In each graphic of Fig. 1, the horizontal axis denotes the transition
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time in years after reforms.
periods, and the vertical axis shows the percentage changes relative to the initial steady state. The final percentage
changes (when T  = 200) can be see in Table 2.
Considering the reform 1, in the first period after the tax change, the labor hours grow sharply (≈3.8%) and the
consumption also increases at around 2.7%. The welfare variation is calculated at around 0.20%. During the following
periods, consumption continues an upward trajectory and the labor hours rise less steeply. These factors allow a gradual
increase in welfare variation, which stabilizes at around 1.02%. The capital stock increases gradually to reach a new
long-term value 1.52% greater than the first steady state. This behaviour in capital stock reflects the trajectory of
investment which grows with more intensity in the short-term. The behaviours of production factors (labor and capital)
imply an upward path for the aggregate output which increases initially by approximately 2.2% and ends at around
2.51%.
The results for the second reform are similar to those from reform 1, but with more moderate values. In this
simulation, there are lower increases on consumption, capital, labor, and aggregate product. The welfare results are
also similar, but less significant than in the first reform. Furthermore, the capital stock remains close to the calibrated
value in 2009 (growth of ≈0.3%).
In the third simulation the results are poorer relatively to the others reforms. Consumption remains close to the
calibrated value in 2009, and the labor hours increase slightly. These behaviours contribute to the welfare loss in the
second steady state. The increase in the tax rate on revenues from labor-intensive sector affects the capital accumulation,
which reduces in the long-term. As a consequence, investment and aggregate output also decrease in the long-term. In
the fourth simulation, the numbers are close to the first scenario, with a slightly better results in all variables, except
labor hours.
We can calculate the present value of the welfare variation according to the Eq. (35). For the first reform, the present
value of the change in welfare is 0.58% (see Table 2), which means that the reform results in small gains in welfare for
the representative household. In the second reform, the changes in consumption and labor hours are lower than those
presented in the first scenario, which results in a present value of welfare gain at about 0.51% (less than in reform 1).
In the third simulation, the present value of the welfare variation is approximately half of the reform 1 (≈  0.28 %). In
the fourth simulation, the welfare gain is 0.53%, which is slightly less than in the first reform. As expected, the worst
performance appears in government revenue neutral scenario.
Fig. 2 shows the behavior of the government revenue. In reforms 1, 2 and 4, revenue loss is severe, especially in
the short term (−4% (reform 1), −2.70% (reform 2) and −4.3% (reform 4)). In the long-term, government revenue
decreases more slowly (reflecting the growth in consumption, capital and product), stabilizing at negative levels
(−3.48% (reforms 1 and 4) and −2.6% (reform 2)).
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In the third reform, there is no loss in government revenue. In this scenario, the present value of the differences of
he government revenue to its calibrated value in the first steady state is approximately 0.16%.
The sectoral results can be seen in Fig. 3. Looking at the numbers for reform 1, it is noticed that there was a
ignificant increase in employment in the labor-intensive sector (which reaches a peak variation at about 5% in the first
eriod after the reform implementation). The opposite occurs with the capital-intensive sector, which shows a sharp
rop in employment (e.g., approximately 3.9% in the short-term). These behaviours reflect the substitution effect on
he labor demands between the capital-intensive and the labor-intensive sectors.
For the first reform, in the first period after the tax change, the capital stock of the labor-intensive sector raises at
bout 1%, while in the capital-intensive sector it decreases close to 1%. As we can see, replacing the payroll tax with a
ate of 1% on revenue was beneficial for the labor-intensive sector, which increases employment and capital in relation
o the initial equilibrium. These short-term fluctuations impact positively on the product of the labor-intensive sector
growth of approximately 3.9%), and negatively on the product of capital-intensive sector (≈−2%). In the long-term,
he capital and labor demands of the labor-intensive sector increase at about 2.1% and 4.4%, respectively. On the other
ide, employment of the capital-intensive sector falls more than 3.6%. These factors have direct impact on industry
roducts. In the second steady state, YI grows 3.7% and Y˜I decreases approximately 0.32%.
The results for the second reform show that, in the short-term, the capital stocks in both sectors (kI and k˜I ) remain
lose to the initial steady state values, while employment grows by 3.65% in labor-intensive sector and decreases by
.89% in the capital-intensive sector. These short-term effects end up raising the product of the sector I  (growth of
.52%) and slightly reducing the product of the sector ˜I  (which falls nearly 0.71%). In the long term, growths of
ectoral product are less expressive in reform 2 than in the first simulation. The reform 2 provides a smaller decline in
mployment of the capital-intensive sector and a less pronounced increase in the employment of the labor-intensive
ector than in reform 1. Overall, the results of both reforms show that the labor-intensive sector (which is less taxed
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after the reforms) benefits from the payroll tax exemption. The growth of employment and output of the labor-intensive
sector are the positive points of the two first reforms.
Looking at the third simulation, the highest level of the revenue tax rate affects the capital factor of the labor-
intensive sector. In the short-term, the capital of the labor-intensive sector falls sharply, while the opposite occurs in the
capital-intensive sector. But this growth is neutralized in the last periods. The employment in the labor-intensive sector
still grows, while the capital-intensive sector drops slightly. As consequence of the short-term fluctuations on capital
and labor, the output of the capital-intensive sector grows significantly in the first period, whereas the production of
labor-intensive industry reduces. During the later periods, both sectoral products decrease.
The results for the fourth reform are close to the first, but with growth rates slightly higher for the sectoral capital and
product, and for the capital-intensive labor hours. Furthermore, relatively to the first scenario, the labor hours growth
rates are slightly lower in the labor-intensive sector.
It is important to say that our results depend on the range of values chosen for the constant elasticity of substitution
parameter λ (see equation (13)). In fact, there is not an econometric consensus about a reasonable choice for this
elasticity, which is a key parameter for our study. In order to overcome this difficulty, an analysis was performed
to the parameter λ. The analysis suggests robust results within the range of λ ∈  [1.7, 2.5] (σ  ∈  [1.66, 2.42]). Those
are reasonable values because it is not expected neither perfect substitutes goods nor perfectly complementary goods
between labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors.
6.  Conclusion
We have used a neoclassical model to analyze the economic effects on the Brazilian economy of a tax reform that
replaces the payroll tax by a tax on revenues of labor-intensive firms. The analysis focused on four reforms. In three
of them we used a tax rate of 1%, 2% and 4% on labor-intensive revenue (reforms 1, 2 and 3, respectively). The fourth
reform reduces the payroll tax rate in order to keep the same loss of government revenue of the first reform.
The effects of the reforms 1 and 2 have shown some bright spots, such as the growth of capital stock, consumption,
the sectoral products, welfare and, most importantly, employment. The labor intensive sector is strongly benefited, but
there are a negative impact on government receipts in both reforms. The results for the reduced payroll tax rate reform
(reform 4) were very close to the first, but resulting in a lower level of welfare gains in present value. For the government
revenue neutral scenario (reform 3), the results are negative, with reduction on capital, product and welfare, with a little
employment growth. This fact suggest that the positive effects from the reforms 1 and 2 were exclusively associated
with the reduced tax burden generated by these reforms. In other words, the tax change proposed by the reforms can
not be an efficient tax choice. The results of the fourth reform reinforces that perception.
The methodology used in this paper has some limitations which are worth mentioning. Firstly, we used a closed
economy model. Secondly, the model does not address uncertainty. In both cases, these improvements are left as an
alternative for future work. A more important limitation regards the use of a single value for the elasticity of substitution
between labor-intensive and capital-intensive goods. Even though the assumption is rather simplistic, the lack of reliable
estimates in literature makes it a viable choice. To overcome this problem, a robustness analysis was performed and
our results remained robust for a reasonable range of values for the constant elasticity of substitution.
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